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In a recent article, Zaleski does not find any clear difference between the political preferences 
of Republican and Democratic administrations with respect to the choice between unemploy- 
ment and inflation. This paper provides empirical support for the opposite conclusion in a 
generalization of Zaleski’s approach allowing for instrument costs. 
1. Introduction 
In a recent issue of this journal, Zaleski (1992) demonstrates that the 
inllation/unemployment ratio may be used as an indicator of the motives 
behind presidential policies. His sample, the period 1961:iii-1989:ii, does not 
reveal any clear Democratic or Republican policy pattern. This result con- 
flicts with those of many other studies (for example, Hibbs 1977; Alesina and 
Sachs 1988; Chappell and Keech 1988). In this paper we argue that Zaleski’s 
approach is a special case of a more general approach to the estimation of 
“revealed’ preferences. We show that the introduction of instrument costs 
reverses Zaleski’s conclusion that Republican administrations are not more 
inflation averse than Democratic administrations. Before that, we will briefly 
review Zaleski’s approach. 
2. Zaleski’s Approach 
The key role of the inflation/unemployment ratio in Zaleski’s article is 
based on the ratio (u/b) of the relative weights of unemployment (U)-in 
deviation from its desired value (U*)-and inflation (p) in the policy maker’s 
quadratic loss function: 
2 = a-(U - u*)z + b.(p)2 . (1) 
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If the loss is minimized subject to the short-run Phillips curve, 
p =f m p”J > (p” refers to the expected inflation) , (2) 
the “preference ratio” can be derived from the first-order condition as1 
(a/b) = -[p/( U - U*)]JjXlU . (3) 
As Zaleski takes the desired value of unemployment to be zero and adopts 
a linear Phillips curve, borrowed from Smyth, Washburn and Dua (1989),2 
this result can be written as 
(a/b) = -3jXW. (p/U) , (4) 
in which djYd U is a constant (- 1.288). Next, using actual values of U and p, 
Zaleski calculates and evaluates the average preference ratio for each pres- 
idential period. 
3. Instrument Costs 
Zaleski’s paper is based on the Barro-Gordon model which is a simple 
quadratic-linear model, revolving around the trade-off between output (un- 
employment) and inflation. Because of its analytical tractability, the Barro- 
Gordon model is very useful to examine important economic concepts, such 
as credibility, reputation and signaling (Persson and Tabellini 1999). More- 
over, the Barro-Gordon model seems to be relevant. In the postwar period, 
unemployment, inflation and their trade-off have played a dominant role in 
discussions about stabilization policy. The quadratic loss function, repre- 
senting the preferences of the policy maker, is flexible: it may represent the 
preferences of both policy oriented policy makers (Alesina 1987 and Swank 
1993) and electoral oriented policy makers (MacRae 1977). However, some 
features of the Barro-Gordon model are clearly stylized. In particular, the 
assumption that the policy maker sets either inflation or unemployment 
directly is shorthand for a more complete model in which the policy maker 
sets actual instrument variables (Persson and Tabellini 19999). In empirical 
analyses, this assumption calls for relaxation, This can be done in two ways. 
First, a complete model could be specified, describing the links between 
instrument and target variables. This approach has the drawback that it would 
increase the sensitivity of the estimates for the weights in the loss function 
to specification uncertainty. Second, the policy maker could be assumed to 
have only imperfect control over unemployment and inflation. This approach 
‘Zaleski mistakenly omits the first minus sign. 
-he Phillips curve estimated by Smyth, Washburn and Dua (1989) is p - p” = -1.288 . 
(U - 6.730) + 0.072 . p”, where p” is the rate of infiation of energy prices. 
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implies that the relationships between actual instruments and unemployment 
and inflation are surrounded with uncertainty (compare Cuckierman and 
Meltzer 1986 and Swank and Hebbink 1992). Gordon (1976) points out that 
this type of uncertainty can be incorporated in quadratic-linear optimization 
problems by adding instrument costs to the loss function. He shows that the 
quadratic-linear policy problem under uncertainty without instrument costs 
is equivalent to the policy problem without uncertainty with instrument costs. 
These considerations warrant the introduction of instrument costs into the 
loss function to account for imperfect control of unemployment and inflation. 
This approach is followed in the next section. 
4. Empirical Results 
In principle, instrument costs can be attached to either the inflation rate 
or the unemployment rate or to both. To facilitate the comparison with 
Zaleski’s results, we will use the same Phillips curve as the restriction under 
which the policy maker optimizes (see footnote 2). As in that equation the 
inflation rate is the dependent variable. We assume that the policy maker 
attaches costs to the adjustment of the unemployment rate. Thus to account 
for instrument costs, we add a third term to the loss function, attributing costs 
to the deviation of the level of the unemployment rate from its previous value 
(U-r). If, without loss of generality, the weights are normalized to add up to 
one, the following loss function results: 
2 = a.(U - U*)’ + b.(p)’ + [l - a - b].( U - U-J2 . (5) 
Equation (5) contains Zaleski’s as a special case (namely for a + b = 1).3 We 
maintain zero unemployment as the target value, so that the term U* drops 
from the equation. Under the present assumptions the preference ratio 
cannot be expressed in terms of the inflation/unemployment ratio. But the 
first-order conditions enable us to express the unemployment rate in terms 
of its lagged value and an inflation-dependent term: 
U= (1 - b)-l-(1 - a - b).U-, - (1 - b)-l.b~c.p . (6) 
The parameters of this reaction function can be estimated by using actual 
values of U, p and the estimated value of c (=- 1.288). The first five rows in 
Table 1 present the results for individual administrations.4 With the exception 
of the a coefficient in the Eisenhower era and the b coefficient in the (for 
lack of observations consolidated) Kennedy/Johnson era, all coefficients are 
3Note that the weights in (1) can be multiplied by any positive value without affecting the 
properties of the loss functions. Due to this, the weights in the loss function can be normalized. 
*We have also estimated the political preferences of the Eisenhower administrations. 
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TABLE 1. Estimation Results (Equation 6) 
Administration a b (a/b) p adjusted R2 sample 
Eisenhower 0.036 0.133” 0.3 0.201 
(0.026) (0.032) (0.230) 
Kennedy/Johnson 0.035” 0.010 3.5 0.331 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.142) 
Nixon/Ford 0.089* 0.073* 1.2 0.589 
(0.021) (0.014) (0.199) 
Carter 0.130” 0.066” 2.0 0.036 
(0.035) (0.016) (0.699) 
Reagan 0.078” 0.103” 0.8 0.699 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.208) 
All 0.033” 0.034* 1.0 0.411 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.084) 
Democrats 0.045” 0.027* 1.7 
(0.019) (0.012) 
0.413 
(0.108) 
Republicans 0.036* 0.050* 0.7 
(0.011) (0.011) 
0.942 
0.966 
0.955 
0.890 
0.967 
0.922 
0.927 
53:iiMl:ii 
6kiii-69:ii 
69:iii-77:ii 
77:iiMl:ii 
81:iiMB:iv 
53ziii-88:iv 
53:iii-88:iv 
NOTE: All equations are estimated with nonlinear least squares and are corrected for 
auto-correlation with the Cochrane-Orcutt method. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* indicates significance at a 0.01 level. F-statistic for the restrictions that a and b are equal for 
Democrats and Republicans is 4.86 (5% critical value is 3.07). 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. There is a consistent partisan 
pattern in the preference ratios, with Democrats attributing relatively more 
weight to the unemployment target, and Republicans to the combat of 
inflation. To test the hypothesis that over the period 1953:iii-1988:iv. Dem- 
ocrats and Republicans had equal preferences, we compare two regressions 
in which all observations are pooled. In the first, we impose the restrictions 
that a and b did not change with the political color of the president. In the 
second, we introduce party related dummies to represent political preference 
differentiation. The restrictions that a and b are equal under Democratic and 
Republican administrations are rejected (x2 statistic = 7.54; 5% critical level 
= 5.99)s As both for Democrats and Republicans the sum of a and b is 
significantly lower than 1, the ZaIeski case (a + b = 1, amounting to the 
absence of instrument costs) is also rejected. 
51f Democrats and Republicans attribute the same costs to instrument manipulation, the 
hypothesis that a/b is the same for Democrats and Republicans is equivalent to the hypothesis 
that Democrats and Republicans have equal preferences. 
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5. Conclusions 
The amendments elaborated above cast serious doubt on the conclu- 
sions of Zaleski’s article. We have presented evidence that Democratic and 
Republican administrations show a different partisan profile in their eco- 
nomic policies. As suggested before, this result appears in line with many 
other studies in this area. We want to stress, however, that the last word is 
far from being said in this debate. Variation of the assumptions underlying 
the estimation of political preferences may generate a host of models, the 
results of which do not necessarily lead to one indisputable conclusion. 
Received: October 1992 
Final version: August 1993 
References 
Alesina, Alberto. “Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Re- 
peated Game.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 52 (1987): 651-78. 
Alesina, Alberta, and Jeffrey Sachs. “Political Parties and the Business Cycle 
in the United States, 19481984.“JournaZ ofMoney, Credit and Banking 
20 (1988): 63-82. 
Chappell, Henry W., and William It. Keech. “The Unemployment Conse- 
quences of Partisan Monetary Policy.” Southern Economic Journal 55 
(1988): 107-22. 
Cuckierman, Alex, and Allan H. Meltzer. “A Theory of Ambiguity, Credi- 
bility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information.” 
Econometrica 54 (1986): 1099-1128. 
Gordon, Robert. “An Interpretation of the Costs on the Instruments in 
Deterministic Linear-Quadratic Control.” International Economic Re- 
view 17 (1976): 779-81. 
Hibbs, Douglas A. “Political Parties and Macro-economic Policy.” American 
Political Science Review 71 (1977): 1467-87. 
MacRae, Duncan C. “A Political Model of the Business Cycle.“]ournaZ of 
Political Economy 85 (1977): 239-63. 
Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics. 
New York: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990. 
Smyth, David J., Susan K. Washburn, and Pami Dua. “Social Preferences, 
Inflation, Unemployment and Political Business Cycles: Econometric Ev- 
idence for the Reagan Presidency.” Southern EconomicJournal 56 (1989): 
33648. 
Swank, Otto H. “A Voter Model Based on the Partisan Theory.” Public 
Choice 75 (1993): 339-56. 
Jan C. &brand and Otto H. Swank 
Swank, Otto H, and Gerbert E. Hebbink. “Estimation of Preference Weights 
in a Model of Monetary Policy with Multiplicative Uncertainty.” Discus- 
sion paper 9216/P, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 1992. 
Zaleski, Peter A. “Presidential Preferences for Inflation Versus Unemploy- 
ment.” ]ournal of Macroeconomics 14 (1992): 555-61. 
558 
